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21 October 1970

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Meeting, Joint Study Group on Egyptian SAM Activity

REFERENCE: a. DDI Memo 14 October, attached  
b. OSR Memo 15 October, attached

1. The initial meeting of the Egyptian SAM Activity Joint Study Group Chaired by [ ] OSR/CIA opened at 1400 hours, 19 October 1970. NPIC representatives were Messrs. [ ]

2. [ ] outlined the reason for forming the task group in stating the following problems:

a. How can we most accurately determine the status of SAM activity in the Standstill Zone.

b. How can a coordinated community position be arrived at and presented to such users as the NSC Staff.

He outlined the aims of the group as follows:

a. Find a basis for solution of the above problems.


b. Establish contact and coordination between all Agencies involved in the problems.

3. Initial discussions involved a brief review of information sources available including Photographic, Comint/Elint and Human Resources. The general consensus was that:

a. Photography was the most effective resource at present.

b. Human resources are improving but limited with regard to the overall scope of collection throughout the Zone.

c. Comint and Elint were not effective as presently employed and, without several new land bases for collection including direction finding facilities, would not be able to contribute significantly to solution of the problems.

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4. The remaining discussions were somewhat rambling without a firm direction. The NSA Representative was unable to remain beyond 1500 hours due to a transportation problem. As a consequence he missed much of the discussion which continued until 1600 hours.

5. Agreement was reached on several points as follows:

a. [ ] tabled the report draft included as attachment 2 and obtained general concurrence in its utility as a format for periodic reporting on the SAM situation.

b. IAS and DIAPP agreed to coordinate their third phase efforts to assess the operational status of SAM units in the Zone.

c. It was agreed that NPIC would not attempt to apply the operational status criteria outlined in attachment 2 during the first phase (IPIR) reporting cycle.

6. A number of other items including U-2 [ ] frequency requirements for photographic coverage and capability of the [ ] cameras were also discussed. The consensus was that the U-2 [ ] capability cannot be upgraded sufficiently to solve the SAM status unknowns, that once weekly photographic coverage of the Zone would probably be adequate to present needs and that the [ ] camera would be the more effective system for determining SAM status.

[ ]  
Chief, Western Geographic Division, IEG/NPIC

Attachment:

1. Ref. a above
2. Ref. b above

Distribution:

- Cy 1 - NPIC/ODir w/att  
2 - NPIC/IEG w/att  
3&4 - NPIC/IEG/WGD

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21 October 1970

15 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans  
Deputy Director for Science &  
Technology  
Director, OSA  
Director, OEL  
Director, OSR  
Director, OSI  
Director, OER  
Director, OCI  
Director, NPIC  
Director, OBG  
Chief, IAS  
Chief, IRS

SUBJECT : Joint Study Group on Egyptian SAM  
Activity

1. The Deputy Director of Intelligence has proposed that a joint undertaking -- to be called Task Force Samsite -- be started to review the status of Egyptian SAM activity. The functions of the task force would be to work out basic criteria, establish agreed community figures, and report new information as received in response to NSC requirements. DIA, State, and NSA have been asked to participate. The undersigned has been designated by the DDI to chair the task force.

2. In order to facilitate consideration of all facets of the problem, all interested components of CIA with intelligence collection or analytical responsibilities related to the Soviet-Egyptian SAM problem should be represented on the task force. The first meeting of Task Force Samsite will be held in the DDI Conference Room at 1400 hours on Monday, 19 October. Please advise [redacted] or the undersigned [redacted] of the name of your representative.

[redacted]  
Chief


Regional Analysis Division, OSR

Attachment:

DDI Memo

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 OCT 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler  
Director, National Security  
Agency

SUBJECT : Proposal for Joint Study Group to  
Review Status of Egyptian SAM  
Activity

1. In our recent efforts to produce coordinated finished intelligence on SAM activity within the Egyptian standstill zone, we have encountered problems resulting from the fact that differing criteria are being used to report on the occupancy and operational status of SAM sites. These differences not only complicate the coordination process but also create confusion for those who receive inconsistent figures from several sources.

2. To clarify this situation, I propose a joint undertaking--to be called Task Force Samsite--be started to work out basic criteria, establish agreed community figures, and report as new information is received. Membership would include representatives from CIA, DIA, State, and NSA. The efforts of such a group could satisfy a number of standing requirements from the NSC Staff and elsewhere for data on this subject. [redacted] of the Office of Strategic Research is prepared to chair Task Force Samsite.

3. If you concur in this proposal, please notify [redacted] of the names of your representatives for the first meeting, to be held in the DDI Conference Room, CIA Headquarters, at 1400 hours, Monday, 19 October 1970.

/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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Trends in the Development of the SAM System  
in Egyptian Standstill Zone

The attached chart shows the development of the SAM defense system since [ ] in the Egyptian standstill zone. It confirms a continuing improvement and expansion of this missile network in the zone despite the cease-fire and standstill agreement of 7 August.

25X1 The [ ] breakdown is between occupied and unoccupied sites only and is not as detailed as that for subsequent dates because of the generally low interpretability of the photography from the [ ] camera system used on that date. Nevertheless, all the 53 sites in the occupied category could be determined to have some missile-related equipment.


Those sites occupied with construction and other such equipment were placed in the unoccupied category.

25X1 Thus, [ ] provides a general order of magnitude of the number of sites having some missile-related equipment, not necessarily a full complement, as well as the total number of sites present in the standstill zone only three days after the standstill agreement took effect.

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A dramatic surge in construction of new SAM sites occurred between [redacted]. Although somewhat overshadowed by this construction activity, there also was a considerable increase in the deployment of missile equipment during this same time period. The increase in the number of sites in category II (probably operationally equipped), is almost four-fold. While the number of sites considered to be operationally equipped (category I), stayed the same between those two dates, there had begun by [redacted] [redacted] a move to significantly increase the deployment of SA-3 equipment in SA-2 sites, a move which is continuing.

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Photography subsequent to [redacted] has revealed no further dramatic increases in construction activity, but a significant increase in the deployment

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of missile equipment did occur.' The number of sites in categories I (operationally equipped) and II (probably operationally equipped) combined constituted about 25 percent of the total number of sites in the zone on [ ] photography.

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The [ ] mission showed that this number had risen to about 40 percent. It has remained at about this level since. Whether the percentage of category I and II sites will climb even higher is at this time problematical.

Changes in the number of sites in categories I and II seem to have an inverse relationship. When there has been an increase or decrease in category I, there has been a nearly corresponding decrease or increase in category II, between [ ]

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[ ] The changes between these two categories almost entirely reflect variations in the interpretability of the photography, but they also may be due in some instances to the shifting about of SAM equipment by the Soviets and Egyptians.

The chart suggests that since [ ] there has been a general leveling off of missile-related activity within the standstill zone. A longer time period, however, is probably necessary before such a judgment can be made with some degree of confidence.

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CRITERIA NOW USED BY IAS TO DESCRIBE THE OPERATIONAL  
STATUS OF OCCUPIED SAM SITES IN THE CEASE-FIRE ZONE, EGYPT

Category I -- Operationally Equipped

A site is considered operationally equipped if it can be seen well enough to determine that the equipment is in fact SAM equipment, rather than dummy and there is enough equipment present to launch at least one missile (i.e. the guidance radar and one or more launchers, and the associated guidance radar vans in an unhardened site).

If a site is covered on marginal photography and the equipment present cannot be identified as SAM equipment, the site is still considered operationally equipped if it has recently been seen well enough to determine that the equipment was SAM and if equipment remains in the same locations. ✓

Category II -- Probably Operationally Equipped

A site is considered probably operationally equipped if it is covered only on photography of insufficient quality for a firm identification of SAM equipment, but it has objects located in one or more launch positions and guidance area. No site shall be included in the category if there has been no evidence of activity or supporting equipment normally associated with an operational site.

Category III -- Doubtful or Not Operationally Equipped

A -- A site is considered not operationally equipped if the objects seen in the central guidance area and launch positions can be identified as non-SAM related, even though all of the equipment in the area cannot be identified.

A site seen on marginal photography is considered doubtful or not operationally equipped if it has a recent history of having not been operationally equipped and it can be established that the objects seen are in the same locations. ✓

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B -- Sites where either the central guidance area of all launch positions are unoccupied are not operationally equipped.


Sites which contain less than the amount of equipment needed to launch a missile (i.e. lacking the vans associated with the radar) and sites where there is no evidence of activity are considered not operationally equipped.

C -- A site is not operationally equipped if it is seen on photography of sufficient quality to determine that the equipment present is dummy, or if the equipment was previously dummy and it can be determined from recent photography that none of the equipment in the site has moved.

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## Distribution of SAM Sites in Egyptian Standstill Zone by Type and Category



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